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I am not certain I envy young men and women who are about to become
lawyers these days. The reputation of the legal profession is at a low ebb.
You can always tell who is unpopular by noting those who become the butt
of attacks from demagogic politicians, and these days politicos find they can
hit the jackpot on the applause meter when they publicly flail away at
lawyers. Rebuttal from the State Bar falls on deaf ears. Indeed, on a Richter
scale of one to ten, lawyers rate at about a two, approximately the same as
Rumanian tennis players and Canadian hunters of baby seals, perhaps a
notch or two above used car salesmen and the endless stream of Watergate
defendants who tell all-or almost all-for a fee, to become known as the
Crook of the Month Club.
As we look ahead to the third century of American law, we must hope that
all of us working together-instead of sniping at one another-can restore
the former luster of our great profession, when we can once again point to a
John Marshall rather than a John Mitchell, to more Harlan Stones, Hugo
Blacks, Benjamin Cardozos, Earl Warrens and William 0. Douglases.
There must be some out there, but they remain undiscovered.
We completed a rather memorable bicentennial year in 1976. It produced
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contained in the address was adapted from a lecture he delivered at the New York University
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its share of trivia, such as red-white-and-blue cosmetics, flag-draped dog
food and star-spangled bikinis. But it did encourage those of us who are
history buffs to revel in refreshing our recollection of the halcyon early days
of our republic. I found myself pondering such phenomena as a nation in
1770 of a mere 2,205,000 people producing a Washington, two Adamses,
Jefferson, Franklin, Tom Paine, Patrick Henry, Hamilton, Madison, John
Jay, John Marshall, all learned, literate, enlightened men of character and
integrity. Then with our more than 200 million people today, as we compare
our contemporary leadership at all levels-even the potential leadership as
far as one can see on the horizon-we must ask plaintively with Archibald
MacLeish: "Where has the grandeur gone?"
I find myself concerned, too, in this year of 1978, that we are only six
years from 1984, the cataclysmic year about which the Englishman George
Orwell long ago warned us in his classic book entitled, simply, 1984.' As
Orwell described the era toward which he saw us plunging, by six years
from now the world will be made up of three monster slave states, powerful,
ruthless, constantly at war. Overworked and undernourished, deprived of
past and future, the average citizen will be a mindless robot, existing in a
world in which love is forbidden by government decree, hatred is aroused
despite one's will, and two-way television makes privacy a punishable
crime.
To reflect upon what the Watergate defendants had in mind for us, to
learn what some government agencies have been doing for us and to us in
the name of national security, to hear the former head of the CIA still insist
we must give up some of our liberties to preserve other liberties, implying
someone determines which shall be destroyed and which preserved-all
suggest that Orwell's 1984 may yet be our destiny.
Nevertheless I am an eternal optimist. There will be no inevitability of
1984, so long as we maintain intact our legal system composed of an
independent judiciary. Our profession has its shortcomings, revealed
primarily by the bar and the bench themselves. Despite carping critics,
members of the legal profession give every indication of doing their utmost
to discover and to eliminate the deficiencies in our system, that is, those
burdens that are not inherent in a democratic way of life.
A year ago last October the Society of American Law Teachers, a
prestigious national organization of academicians, released a 31-page sum-
mary of Burger Court opinions 2 which added up to a conclusion that there is
a pattern of closing the federal courthouse to "minorities, women, victims
of consumer fraud, poor people, victims of legislative malapportionment,
I. G. ORWELL, 1984 (1949).
2. Society of American Law Teachers, Statement of the Board of Governors, Oct. 10,
1976.
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environmentalists, prisoners, mental patients, victims of governmental
irregularities. . . . .3 The cases supporting that conclusion were roughly
categorized in this manner:
1. Those procedurally curtailing access to the federal court actions
traditionally in those courts-these include the cases on standing and class
actions.
2. Those requiring great deference to state court proceedings-these
include restrictions on federal court injunctions against state enforcement
and forfeiture of the right to federal habeas corpus review of constitutional
defects in state court convictions.
3. Those denying the lower courts the power to fashion appropriate
remedies for constitutional violations, including the grant of attorneys' fees,
as well as other decisions cutting back on a federal court's power to redress
or prevent harms by state officials.
That is a strong indictment and I shall not venture an opinion as to its
accuracy. My bottom line is that for those who believe that to be the current
trend, all is not lost-at least in such enlightened states as California.
For 173 of the 200 years of this republic a relentless tide of judicial
authority has flowed from the states to the federal government. From John
Marshall's opinion in Marbury v. Madison4 in 1803 to very recent days, the
highest courts in the several states were often reduced to the status of
intermediate appellate tribunals, mere wayside stations on the route from
trial courts to the Supreme Court. I do not for one moment suggest that this
was entirely unnecessary or undesirable. Back in 1951 one learned commen-
tator reviewed the somewhat dismal performance of state courts in enforcing
provisions of their own constitutions and observed that "if our liberties are
not protected in Des Moines the only hope is in Washington." 5
That observation turned out to be a prophecy. The Warren Court, from its
inception in 1953, served as the midwife to a new design of constitutional
law. The previous era had been characterized by a benign acceptance of
racism, political rotten boroughs, disability of the poor, an Anthony
Comstock approach to sexual matters, denial of universal suffrage, egregi-
ous imposition upon the rights of the criminally accused. Under Chief
Justice Warren and his colleagues, the Court abandoned its apathetic ap-
proach to overt injustice in society and elected to employ the federal
constitution to achieve a liberating and egalitarian impact in the areas of
political opportunity, criminal justice, and racial equality.
As a result, the states were compelled to fall in line. Despite the furor
3. Id.
4. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
5. Paulsen, State Constitutions, State Courts and First Amendment Freedoms, 4 VAND.
L. REV. 620, 642 (1951).
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over many of the decisions, notably in the areas of reapportionment6 and
protection of the rights of criminal defendants, 7 state courts swallowed their
own prejudices, abandoned the dictates of stare decisis and obediently
embarked upon the new course. Between Mapp v. Ohio' in 1961 and
Benton v. Maryland9 in 1969, the nation underwent what one commentator
described as a "criminal procedure revolution."' ' 0
California's Supreme Court under Chief Justice Roger Traynor had anti-
cipated the trend. California adopted the exclusionary rule11 six years before
the United States Supreme Court applied the Wolf v. Colorado12 rule to the
states in Mapp v. Ohio. 13 Back in 1903 Iowa had anticipated Weeks v.
United States 4 by 11 years. '5 But most states had been apathetic; they took
their cue from the 1833 case of Barron v. Baltimore16 which declared:
"The constitution was ordained and established by the people of the United
States for themselves, for their own government, and not for the government
of the individual states." 17
Although there were a few state court evasions of the Warren Court
reforms,' 8 ultimately the states adapted their criminal techniques to the High
Court's requirements. Some results were labored, as, for example, applying
the fourth amendment to a back-alley trash can,19 but in general a satisfac-
tory accommodation was achieved. Police officers were taught how lawfully
to enforce the law; trial judges became reconciled to admitting only legally
obtained evidence.
Just as an era of peaceful coexistence seemed imminent, the post-Warren
counterrevolution began. Few will gainsay the observation of Professor
Wilkes that the current Supreme Court "is no longer a bold, innovative
institution and has abandoned, for the moment at least, the role of keeper of
the nation's conscience." 20 As indicated previously, I do not intend to
venture a judgment on that course; perhaps it is wise and inevitable that we
follow a period of hypertension with years of lowered expectations.
6. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
7. F. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND (1970).
8. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
9. 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
10. Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure: State Court Evision of the Burger
Court, 62 KY. L.J. 421, 422 (1974).
11. People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
12. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
13. 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
14. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
15. See State v. Sheridan, 121 Iowa 164, 96 N.W. 730 (1903).
16. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
17. Id. at 247.
18. Beatty, State Court Evasion of United States Supreme Court Mandates During the
Last Decade of the Warren Court, 6 VAND. L. REv. 260 (1972).
19. People v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 357, 365, 486 P.2d 1262, 1267, 96 Cal. Rptr. 62, 67 (1971),
vacated and remanded per curiam, 409 U.S. 33 (1972); 8 Cal. 3d 623, 504 P.2d 457, 105 Cal.
Rptr. 521 (1973), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 919 (1973) (determined to have relied upon independent
state ground).
20. Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure: State Court Evasion of the Burger
Court, 62 Ky. L.J. 421, 421 (1974).
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But what can reasonably be expected of state courts? Are they alternately
to create and then to abandon doctrines of state authority as the tides on the
Potomac ebb and flow?
Consider as an example the requirement that counsel be present at
lineups. This rule was adopted by the Supreme Court in 1967 in United
States v. Wade2' and Gilbert v. California22 under the frequently articulated
theory that adversary criminal proceedings begin not in the courtroom but at
the police station. 23 Justice Brennan, writing for the Court in Wade, empha-
sized the importance of the presence of counsel at "critical confrontations"
and firmly declared that "we scrutinize any pretrial confrontation of the
accused.' '24 And in Stovall v. Denno25 the Court added unequivocally that
"counsel is required at all confrontations" for identification. 26
I candidly admit to misgivings about the role of an attorney at a lineup,
and I so expressed them in a dissent in People v. Williams27 in 1971. But in
a series of cases28 involving all types of lineups our state court obediently
followed directions from above. Manifestly, it seemed to us, "any" pretrial
confrontation and "all" confrontations for identification implied no limita-
tion to merely post-indictment proceedings. But along came Kirby v. Il-
linois29 in 1972, and mirabile dictu the High Court found it to be "firmly
established" that the right to counsel attaches only at the time judicial
proceedings have been initiated. 30 "Any" and "all" have been translated to
mean "very few," for post-indictment lineups are rarely held, and when
they are, it is merely for the purpose of refreshing identifications previously
made. Now the right to counsel "is afforded the defendant where he least
needs it." '31
The right to privacy is another area of concern. In 1927 Justice Brandeis
wrote that "[t]he makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. . . .They conferred, as against the
government, the right to be left alone-the most comprehensive of rights
and the right most valued by civilized man.' 32
Consider, in that context, the result of the Supreme Court refusal33 in
1976 to review a three-judge decision in Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney,
21. 388 U.S. 218, 236-37 (1967).
22. 388 U.S. 263, 273 (1967).
23. See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
24. 388 U.S. 218, 227 (emphasis in original).
25. 388 U.S. 293 (1967) (emphasis added).
26. Id. at 298.
27. People v. Williams, 3 Cal. 3d 853, 858, 478 P.2d 942, 945, 92 Cal. Rptr. 6, 9 (1971)
(Mosk, J., dissenting).
28. Beginning with People v. Forler, 1 Cal. 3d 335,461 P.2d 643, 82 Cal. Rptr. 363 (1969).
29. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
30. Id. at 688.
31. N.R. SOBEL, EYE-WITNESS IDENTIFICATION: LEGAL AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS 33
(1972).
32. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
33. 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
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City of Richmond34 denying the right of privacy to consenting homosexuals.
Apparently upon warrant or probable cause law enforcement officers are
permitted nocturnal sweeps into bedrooms in search of sexual scofflaws.
Thus the only hope of preserving this seemingly clear right of privacy
remains with the more benign states that, some by court action and some by
legislative enactment, have curbed local zealots who suspect Sodom and
Gomorrah behind every keyhole.
That leads to the murkey field of obscenity which Justice Douglas once
termed a "hodgepodge" that has "no business being in the courts."
Everyone can agree that the term obscenity refers generically to speech,
writing, cinematography and stage performances which deal with sex in
such a manner as to put such forms of expression beyond protection of the
first amendment. But beyond definition our problems compound.
For years federal and state courts grappled with the Roth rule, 35 which,
had it not suffered an untimely demise, would have been 22 years old this
year. To some the problem was simple. The Wisconsin Supreme Court
declared "obscenity is not so elusive a concept as to require expert tes-
timony." 36 South Carolina agreed.37 An Ohio judge adopted a simpler test:
"That the material acts as an aphrodisiac can almost be determined physi-
cally . . . a judge or juror should be able to estimate that rather closely by
the reaction he himself has to the material.''38 1 can hear his jury instruction
now: "Ladies and gentlemen of the jury: in the final analysis what is
obscene is whatever turns you on."
Other courts were less self-confident; they required expert testimony on
the concepts of prurient appeal,39 customary limits of candor, 4° and the Roth
tests in general,4 which one state referred to in terms of its "exquisite
vagueness. "42
Just as the states, one way or another, were adjusting to Roth, in 1973 the
rules of the game were changed in Miller v. California43 and several
companion cases. Whereas previously the High Court declared in Roth and
reaffirmed in Jacobellis v. Ohio,44 that "the constitutional status of an
allegedly obscene work must be determined on the basis of a. . . national
Constitution we are expounding," 45 in the new Miller test courts are to
34. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975).
35. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
36. State v. Simpson, 56 Wis. 2d 27, 38, 201 N.W.2d 558, 564 (1972).
37. State v. Watkins, 259 S.C. 185, 195-96, 191 S.E.2d 135, 140 (1972).
38. City of Cincinnati v. Walton, 167 Ohio St. 14, 23, 145 N.E.2d 407, 413 (1952).
39. Ramirez v. State, 430 P.2d 826, 828 (Okla. Crim. 1967).
40. G.P. Putnam's Sons v. Calissi, 86 N.J. Super. 82, 92, 205 A.2d 913, 920 (1964).
41. Sanza v. Maryland State Bd. of Censors, 245 Md. 319, 326-27, 226 A.2d 317, 320
(1967); Keuper v. Wilson, 111 N.J. Super. 489, 493, 268 A.2d 753, 755 (1970).
42. Commonwealth v. LaLonde, 218 Pa. Super. 805, 812, 288 A.2d 782, 787 (1972).
43. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
44. 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
45. Id. at 195 (emphasis added).
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apply "contemporary community standards. " 46 Indeed, it was even more
specific than that: prosecutions were to be limited to materials that depicted
"patently offensive" sexual conduct "specifically defined by the applicable
state law." 47
The shift from Roth to Miller was momentous enough for the states to
follow. But while Miller was still undergoing scrutiny, and some state
courts were beginning to adjust, Smith v. United States48 was decided last
session. A federal conviction was upheld for using the mails to distribute
obscene materials, all within the State of Iowa, even though at the time there
were, due to a legislative hiatus, no criminal laws relating to obscenity on
the books.49 The majority stated, directly contrary to Miller, that the proper
community standard was "not one that can be defined legislatively. '50 A
jury randomly selected, can peer into the soul of the community and
determine standards more unerringly than democratically responsible state
legislators.
There were other difficult obscenity cases this past term: Marks v. United
States,51 Splawn v. California5 2 and Ward v. Illinois.5 3 The inescapable
conclusion is that the whole problem remains no less intractable than it was
when Roth was announced 20 years ago. Obscenity seems to lend itself to
ad hoc adjudications that make it impossible for state courts to adapt
principles with any precision.
One other area of difficulty: trying to square the High Court decision in
Williams v. Florida5 4 approving a requirement to reveal alibi witnesses with
the constitutional freedom from self-incrimination. There is some confusion
in California because Justice Traynor improvidently referred to discovery as
a two-way street in Jones.5 But Jones must be read in the light of its facts: a
defendant asking the court for an order and the court imposing a condition
for the granting of the request. 56 Most state courts recognize a criminal
defendant has a right to remain totally mute-he need not even speak to
enter a plea; if he is silent, the court enters a not guilty plea on his behalf.
Thus how can he be compelled to reveal his defense or his witnesses, and if
he persists in remaining mute, how can sanctions be invoked?
In the final analysis, as the Supreme Court has careened from one end of
the constitutional spectrum to the other, 57 state courts have two alternatives.
46. 413 U.S. at 24 (emphasis added).
47. Id. at 25.
48. 431 U.S. 291 (1977).
49. Id. at 295-96.
50. Id. at 302.
51. 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
52. 431 U.S. 595 (1977).
53. 431 U.S. 767 (1977).
54. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
55. Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 59-60, 372 P.2d 919, 921,22 Cal. Rptr. 879, 881
(1962).
56. Id. at 61-62, 372 P.2d at 922, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 882.
57. L.W. LEvY, AGAINST THE LAW: THE NIXON COURT AND CRIMINAL JuSTIcE 87 (1974).
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They can shift gears and once again change directions, thus resuming the
course upon which they were embarked in the pre-Warren era. Or they can
retain existing individual rights by reliance upon the independent nonfederal
grounds found in the several state constitutions. A growing number of states
have adopted the latter course.
Indeed, on several occasions Justice Brennan cordially invited the states
to do so, most recently in a Harvard Law Review article. 58 In his dissent in
Michigan v. Mosley59 he reminded us that each "state has power to impose
higher standards governing police practices under state law than is required
by the Federal Constitution,' 60 citing Oregon v. Hass,61 Lego v.
Twomey, 62 and Cooper v. California,63 and he enumerated several state
courts which have done so.64 There are now at least 18 states which have
used independent state constitutional grounds in a wide variety of subjects. 65
Our state has been a leader in this area.
California has a long record of reliance upon its own constitution.a6 Our
bilingual charter, originally adopted in 1849, a year after the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo, was clearly meant to be an independent source of
individual rights. As presently constituted, the Bill of Rights in our state
58. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L.
REv. 489 (1977).
59. 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
60. Id. at 120 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
61. 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975).
62. 404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972).
63. 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967).
64. 423 U.S. at 121 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
65. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 781 (1970); Scott v. State, 519 P.2d 774 (Alaska 1974);
Grossman v. State, 457 P.2d 226 (Alaska 1976); People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272,
127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976); People v. Lonzwire, 14 Cal. 3d 943, 538 P.2d 753, 123 Cal. Rptr. 297(1975); People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975); Reynolds
v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 834, 528 P.2d 45, 117 Cal. Rptr. 437 (1974); Blocker v. Blackburn,
228 Ga. 285, 185 S.E.2d 56 (1971); Carley v. Lewless, 227 Ga. 745, 182 S.E.2d 766 (1971); State
v. Kaluna, 55 Hawaii 361, 520 P.2d 51 (1974); State v. Santiago, 53 Hawaii 254, 492 P.2d 657(1971); Haas v. South Bend Comm. Sch. Corp., 259 Ind. 515, 289 N.E.2d 495 (1972); State v.
Mullen, 216 N.W.2d 375 (Iowa 1974); People v. Beavers, 383 Mich. 554,227 N.W.2d 511 (1975),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 878 (1975); People v. White, 390 Mich. 245, 212 N.W.2d 222 (1973);
People v. Turner, 390 Mich. 7, 210 N.W.2d 336 (1973); State v. Granberry, 491 S.W.2d 528 (Mo.
1973); Baker v. State, 88 Nev. 369,498 P.2d 1310 (1972); State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 346 A.2d
66 (1975); Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973); John v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d
771 (N.D. 1974); Chandler v. State, 501 P.2d 512 (Okla. 1972); State v. Brown, 262 Ore. 442, 497
P.2d 1191 (1972); Commonwealth v. Triplett, 462 Pa. 244,341 A.2d 62 (1975); Commonwealth v.
Campana, 455 Pa. 622, 314 A.2d 854 (1974), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1974); State ex rel.
Payne v. Walden, 156 W. Va. 60, 190 S.E.2d 770 (1972); McConville v. State Farm Auto. Co.,
15 Wis. 2d 374, 113 N.W.2d 14 (1972); Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure:
State Court Evasion of the Burger Court, 62 Ky. L.J. 421, 450 (1974).
66. In 1955 California adopted the exclusionary rule, six years before the United States
Supreme Court applied Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1948), to the states in Mapp v, Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961). The Supreme Court of California adopted the position deliberately in People v.
Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955), when Chief Justice Roger Traynor wrote the
provisions of the constitution "contemplate that it is preferable that some criminals go free than
that the right of privacy of all the people be set at naught." Id. at 449, 282 P.2d at 914. In taking
that step, Justice Traynor declared that
[i]n developing a rule of evidence applicable in the state courts, this court is not bound
by the decisions that have applied the federal rule, and if it appears that those
decisions have developed needless refinements and distinctions, this court need not
follow them.
Id. at 450, 282 P.2d at 915.
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constitution67 contains more specific individual guarantees than those
enumerated in the federal constitution's first ten, plus the fourteenth,
amendments. Indeed our charter specifically declares: "Rights guaranteed
by this Constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed by the United
States Constitution.'"68
In virtually every area of constitutional law there are California cases
resting squarely upon our own constitution. 69 Two law review commen-
tators have gone so far as to suggest that the "California Supreme Court
may be likened, in these years of equal-protection gloom on the national
scene, to those monks who kept classical learning alive so that it might be
rediscovered in the Renaissance. "70
At least two relevant questions arise regarding this recycled federalism. Is
it historically tenable? Is it permitted by the Supreme Court? I respond
affirmatively to both queries.
A reading of the Federalist Papers clearly reveals an intent by the Found-
ing Fathers to leave the states as a repository of individual rights. Hamilton
and Madison so declared over and over. Madison put it this way:
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal
government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the
State governments are numerous and indefinite. The former will
be exercised principally on external objects, as war, peace, negoti-
ation, and foreign commerce; with which last the power of taxa-
tion will, for the most part, be connected. The powers reserved to
the several States will extend to all the objects which, in the
ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and proper-
ties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and pros-
perity of the State. 71
67. CAL. CONsT. art I, §§1-28.
68. CAL. CONsT. art I, §24.
69. For a compilation, see Falk, The State Constitution: A More than "Adequate"
Nonfederal Ground, 61 CALIF. L REV. 273, 277-79 nn.17 & 18 (1973). For a most flattering
analysis of "California's example" see the extensive list of state bill of rights cases discussed in
8 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 324-26 (1973); Wright, The Role of the Judiciary: From Marbury to
Anderson, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 1262, 1269-72 (1972).
70. Horowitz & Karst, The California Supreme Court and State Action Under the Four-
teenth Amendment: The Leader Beclouds the Issue, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1421, 1421 (1974).
71. THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (Madison). See also THE FEDERALIST No. 14 (Madison), No.
23 (Hamilton), No. 32 (Hamilton), No. 38 (Madison), No. 43 (Madison), No. 82 (Hamilton), and
No. 83 (Hamilton). The following excerpt from No. 17 (Hamilton) is particularly significant on
the role of the state judiciary:
There is one transcendant advantage belonging to the province of the State govern-
ments, which alone suffices to place the matter in a clear and satisfactory light-I
mean the ordinary administration of criminal and civil justice. This, of all others, is the
most powerful, most universal, and most attractive source of popular obedience and
attachment. It is this which, being the immediate and visible guardian of life and
property, having its benefits and its terrors in constant activity before the public eye,
regulating all those personal interests and familiar concerns to which the sensibility of
individuals is more immediately awake, contributes more than any other circumstance
to impressing upon the minds of the people affection, esteem, and reverence towards
the government. This great cement of society, which will diffuse itself almost wholly
through the channels of the particular governments, independent of all other causes of
influence, would insure them so decided an empire over their respective citizens as to
render them at all times a complete counterpoise, and, not infrequently, dangerous
rivals to the power of the Union.
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It is urged that most state constitutions derive universally in inspiration
and often in text from provisions of the federal constitution. This is said to
be particularly so with the reference to bills of individual rights.
It may be noted, however, with equal relevance that our Founding Fathers
obtained their inspiration and texts for the first ten amendments from the
predecessors of the states, the colonies and their declaration of rights. The
Virginia Declaration of Rights set the example for eight of the 12 states
which framed new constitutions during the Revolutionary period,72 and it
was the Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights of 1776 that, with regard to
freedom of speech and press, was the direct precursor of perhaps the most
significant guarantee of the Federal Bill of Rights. 73 Delaware's Declaration
of Rights, 1776, inspired federal provisions against quartering of soldiers
and ex post facto laws;74 Maryland that same year prohibited bills of
attainder, 75 and North Carolina's Declaration, 1776, "contains a compen-
dium of most of the fundamental rights which had come to be recognized by
American Constitution-makers."76
As to contemporary authority, the Supreme Court has consistently held
that states may impose higher standards than those required by the United
States Constitution. 77 Justice Harlan in particular was a consistent advocate
of decentralizing criminal justice, urging that state criminal procedure
should be uninhibited by federal restraints as long as there is adherence to
fundamental standards of fairness. 71 Chief Justice Burger has expressed a
similar viewpoint. 79
The most recent encouragement for this new attitude toward and by state
courts can be traced to Younger v. Harris,80 argued in 1969, reargued twice
in 1970 and decided in early 1971. The opinion by Justice Black declared,
"Since the beginning of this country's history Congress has, subject to few
exceptions, manifested a desire to permit state courts to try state cases free
from interference by federal courts." 81 The underlying reason for federal
courts to abstain from interfering with state prosecution is
the notion of "comity," that is, a proper respect for state func-
tions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up
of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of
the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States
72. 1 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 256 (1971).
73. Id. at 262.
74. Id. at 276.
75. Id. at 279.
76. Id. at 286.
77. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 n.4 (1975); Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477,489
(1972); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 60-61 (1968); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62
(1967); Jankovich v. Indiana Toll Road Comm'n, 379 U.S. 491-92 (1965).
78. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 616 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring); Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504, 509 (1958).
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and their institutions are left free to perform their separate func-
tions in their separate ways.82
This, said Justice Black, is the essence of federalism, to the ideal of which
we must remain loyal. 83
To avoid any misunderstanding, let me emphasize I am not advocating
the right of state courts to differ with the United States Supreme Court on
federal constitutional interpretations. Obviously if state courts unduly re-
strict individual rights under the federal constitution, the Supreme Court will
take appropriate action. 84 And when state courts have presumed to extend
individual rights under the United States Constitution more broadly than has
the High Court, state decisions have also been reversed. 85 What I am stating
is that the American constitutional scheme neither requires nor necessarily
prefers that state judges conform their interpretation of state constitutions to
the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the federal constitution.
The use of state constitutions is no sport designed to thwart federal
review, although that is a salutary by-product. Invoking state rather than
federal authority benefits defendants who find themselves unable to avail
themselves of individual rights in the federal system. It also benefits prose-
cutors in the hastening of the finality of court decisions, and thus the
avoidance of interminable appeals through the federal system after exhaus-
tion of state courts.
It seems to me the rational course is for the highest courts of a state to
evaluate state legislation, state administrative action, or the conviction of a
defendant in a state prosecution, pursuant to the provisions of the state
constitution. If the result is fragmentation of a national consciousness, it is
justified in furtherance of an expanded liberty.
Why do we have two sets of constitutions-federal and state-in this one
nation? Perhaps an answer can be found in this mythical quotation from
Alice in Wonderland:
Alice skwooched up her forehead and ventured quietly, "If he
writes the same thing, why does he do it twice?" "Because," said
the White Rabbit, "he may write the same thing, but it's read
differently. "86
The United States has learned much in the past 200 years. But federal
institutions still do not have all the solutions. Encouraging the 50 states to
experiment, to retain their historic individuality, to seek innovative re-
sponses to problems of protecting individual liberty, may ultimately produce
more of the answers in the century ahead.
82. Id. at 44.
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471
(1972); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30 (1970).
85. See, e.g., Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47 (1973); California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424
(1971); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
86. This delightful creation can be found in the fine new publication of the young members
of the American Bar Association, 2 A.B.A. BARRISTER 49.
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